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The Supreme National Tribunal of Poland (Najwy_zszy Trybunal Narodowy
(Tribunal)) operated from 1946 to 1948. It implemented the 1943 Moscow
Declaration in the case of suspected Nazi war criminals. This article unpacks two of
the Tribunal’s trials, that of Rudolph Ho« ss (Kommandant of Auschwitz (Os¤ wie cim)
and Amon Go« th (commander of the Krako¤ w-Plaszo¤ w labour camp). Following an
introduction, the article proceeds in four sections. Section 2 sets out the Tribunal’s
provenance and background, offering a flavour of the politics and pressures that con-
toured (and co-opted) its activities so as to recover its place within the imagined
spaces of international criminal accountability. Sections 3 and 4, respectively,
examine the Go« th and Ho« ss cases. These sections set out the two defendants and
their crimes. They also excavate the Tribunal’s doctrinal innovations and frustra-
tions, in particular regarding how it understood genocide, organizational liability,
membership in criminal organizations and medical war crimes. Section 5 concludes.
It does so by assessing the Tribunal’s legacy and by linking the Tribunal’s activities
to broader epistemological, didactic and penological concerns central to the operation
of transitional justice.
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The Supreme National Tribunal of Poland (Najwy_zszy Trybunal Narodowy
(Tribunal)) operated for a brief two-year period from 1946 to 1948. The
Tribunal enforced the 1943 Moscow Declaration. This instrument provided for
the repatriation of suspected Nazi war criminals. Defendants were to be sent
to the countries where they had allegedly committed atrocities to stand trial
and, if convicted, to face sentences ç all based on applicable national
laws. The Tribunal presided over seven high-profile cases. These proceedings
implicated a total of 49 individual defendants.
This article unpacks two of the Tribunal’s trials:1 that of Rudolph Ho« ss
(Kommandant of Auschwitz (Os¤ wiecim))2 and that of Amon Go« th (commander
of the Krako¤ w-Plaszo¤ w labour camp).3 The Tribunal’s opening case concerned
Arthur Greiser, the notorious Governor of the Warthegau (a region of occupied
Poland).4 As with Ho« ss and Go« th, Greiser was convicted and executed.
The Greiser case in fact constitutes the first conviction of an influential Nazi
German official for the crime of waging aggressive war insofar as it predates the
judgment and sentence of the International Military Tribunal (IMT, or
Nuremberg Tribunal). TheTribunal, in subsequent cases, addressed the responsi-
bility of members of the General Government established by the Nazis in the cen-
tral and southern part of occupied Poland and determined the General
1 Each of the Ho« ss, Go« th and Greiser cases is summarized in English in the Law Reports of Trials of
War Criminals, a compiled anthology of notes and reports of selected post-WorldWar II proceed-
ings assembled by the United Nations War Crimes Commission. These are available in bound
volumes and on the Legal Tools Database. The Law Reports do not verbatim reproduce any
aspect of the proceedings (including the judgment). Rather, they summarize in English (not
Polish) the indictment, trial, verdict and the judgment (although on occasion they directly ex-
cerpt the Tribunal’s language albeit in English translation) while also analysing key legal
issues and providing rich factual background. Four of the Tribunal’s seven judgments are com-
piled in this anthology. The anthology also contains relevant statutory materials, including
Polish Law Concerning Trials of War Criminals, in an Annex (hereinafter ‘Law Reports,
Annex’). The Law Reports are not authentic primary documents and hence arrive with some
inherent limitations (as do I, in so far as I do not speak or read Polish). I nonetheless believe
the Law Reports to be of very high credibility and hence extensively rely upon them as sources.
2 Ho« ss proceedings reported in the Legal Tools Database, available online at http://www.
legal-toolsorg/en/go-to-database/record/9e87ed/ (visited 30 September 2015) (hereinafter
‘Ho« ss Law Reports’). Auschwitz served both as a concentration camp (forced labour for a
small minority of inmates, generally followed by death) and as an extermination camp (imme-
diate execution). See also J. Tenenbaum, ‘Auschwitz in Retrospect: The Self-Portrait of Rudolf
Ho« ss, Commander of Auschwitz’, 15 Jewish Social Studies (1953) 203, at 219 (‘The sprawling
Camp Auschwitz extended for over 40 square kilometers, with 60 affiliated labor camps ::: . At
its peak, Auschwitz contained 140,000 prisoners’).
3 Go« th proceedings reported in the Legal Tools Database, available online at http://www.legal-
tools.org/en/doc/7ac212/ (visited 30 September 2015) (hereinafter ‘Go« th Law Reports’).
4 For discussion of this case, see M. Drumbl, ‘‘‘Germans are the Lords and Poles are the Servants’’:
The Trial of Arthur Greiser in Poland, 1946’, in G. Simpson and K. Heller (eds), Untold Stories:
Hidden Histories ofWar Crimes Trials (Oxford University Press, 2013) 411.
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Government to be a criminal organization.5 The Bu« hler case, decided in July
1948, offers a rich description of the deployment of the judicial function in occu-
pied Poland as ‘part of the German machinery for extermination of people’.6
The Tribunal pursued punitive as well as didactic goals in conducting its
trials. On this latter note, the Tribunal aspired to educate the world about
Poland’s suffering during the Nazi occupation. Accordingly, its proceedings
tended to project the Final Solution as crimes against Europe’s Jewish popula-
tion as well as against the Polish peoples and the Slavic nations. Poland had
clamoured ç unsuccessfully ç for special status at the IMT.7 The Tribunal
was a response to the Allies’ having rebuffed the Polish request. Polish prosecu-
tors felt the IMT judgment did not engage sufficiently with the suffering of
the Polish people at the hands of the Nazis. Through its work, the Tribunal in-
tended to redress this deficit. It also sought to telegraph to European audiences
an image of a competent and professional Polish legal system.While the trials
assuredly were about the accused, they also were about the Polish nation as a
whole; the trials served both as a means for justice and as a medium to dissem-
inate a much wider historical narrative.
Notwithstanding these expressive ambitions, strikingly little has been writ-
ten about the Tribunal outside Poland. While more robust, discussion within
Poland has nonetheless failed to catalyse a broader transnational conversation.
The marginalization of the Tribunal in international legal circles traces to sev-
eral factors: the influence of the Anglosphere in international criminal law,
the anaemic distribution of Tribunal judgments, linguistic barriers, the Cold
War divide and unresolved historiographical debates over collaboration and re-
sistance in occupied Poland. The hagiography of Nuremberg as a situs of post-
war justice, moreover, colonizes any conversation about the Tribunal.
Tellingly, one of the few English language scholarly articles on the Tribunal is
entitled ‘Poland’s Nuremberg’.8 This editorial move makes plain Nuremberg’s re-
lentless iconicity in the international legal imagination notwithstanding the
fact that the Tribunal issued its first two judgments before ç and continued
its work well after ç the release of the IMT judgment.
The neglect of theTribunal’s work disappoints in light of the distinctive qual-
ity of its jurisprudence, its salience to Poland and its myriad doctrinal contribu-
tions. While the Tribunal was informed by the IMT and international
instruments, it also cultivated its own voice and its own agenda which inten-
tionally departed from the IMT’s.
This article seeks to recover the Tribunal’s place within the imagined spaces
of international criminal accountability. In this regard, this article also seeks
5 The Bu« hler case (which is among those summarized in the Law Reports (hereinafter ‘Bu« hler
Law Reports’) available online at http://www.legal-tools.org/en/go-to-database/record/7721bd/
(visited 30 September 2015) and the Fischer and Leist case (unreported).
6 Bu« hler Law Reports, ibid., at 27. Bu« hler, a lawyer, was the deputy to Governor-General Hans
Frank.
7 A. Prusin, ‘Poland’s Nuremberg: The Seven Court Cases of the Supreme National Tribunal,
1946-1948’, 24 Holocaust and Genocide Studies (2010) 1, at 2.
8 Ibid.
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to highlight the catalytic role of East Europeans in the genesis and construc-
tion of post-war justice, including eventually within the United Nations War
Crimes Commission.9 This role is often peripheralized, stereotyped or down-
played. Relatedly, this article also excavates the Tribunal’s doctrinal contribu-
tions. At times, these contributions were elegant; at other times, they were
awkward.
The decrees that wove theTribunal’s foundational legal base were enacted in
a tautly political atmosphere. These instruments were initially adopted in
haste by the Polish Committee of National Liberation (the Lublin
Committee)10 and later amended and consolidated as Communist authorities
ç backed by Stalin ç tightened their grip over the liberated country. These de-
crees were not received into domestic law in a democratic or reflective fashion.
From the perspective of virtue ethics, moreover, these decrees were intended
to inflate the state’s punitive reach over domestic ‘traitors’ and ‘fascist-Hitlerite
criminals’, including members of the former underground resistance and
others perceived as part of the non-Communist opposition movement.11 Many
such ‘traitors’ were prosecuted in summary courts before, during and after the
Tribunal’s operation. Despite the motivations behind and realities of these de-
crees, however, they paradoxically served as the bedrock of the substantive
law as applied by the Tribunal which also included, inter alia, domesticated
elements of international treaty and customary law at the time. The Tribunal
therefore stands as an example of how moments of transitional justice may
spring from impure sources; repressive penal law may facilitate outcomes that
international lawyers would embrace as transformative or emancipatory. On
an obverse note, and apart from the Polish case, once international criminal
law is domesticated a risk also arises that it may become deployed for coercive,
ulterior and regressive purposes regardless of the fanfare and good intentions
that may accompany its initial reception into domestic law. Penal law’s intrin-
sic dual aspects ç namely, as simultaneous conduits for justice and for repres-
sion ç remain surprising only if one accepts the starry-eyed, albeit strikingly
pervasive, mystique of international criminal law as messiah plagued only by
lack of adequate enforcement.
This article proceeds in four sections. Section 2 sets out the Tribunal’s prov-
enance and background, while also surveying the politics and pressures that
dually enabled and crimped its activities. Sections 3 and 4, respectively, exam-
ine the Go« th and Ho« ss cases. These sections set out the two defendants and
their crimes, while also raising doctrinal quandaries and contributions.
9 For general exposition of the unheralded contributions of the 1943^1948 UN War Crimes
Commission, see the excellent work of the Research Programme on UN War Crimes
Commission.
10 The Lublin Committee was proclaimed as a provisional government of Poland on 22 July 1944.
11 K. Kersten,The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland,1943^1948 (trans. J. Micgiel and M.H.
Bernhard, University of California Press, 1991), at 108^109. See also ibid., at 153^154, 240, 318,
384^385, 421, 459^461 for detailed discussion of a variety of criminal prosecutions conducted
under a diverse array of enabling instruments in Poland and in the Soviet Union against inter
alia members of the former Polish underground.
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Throughout, references are made to other cases pursued by the Tribunal.
Section 5 concludes.
2. The Tribunal: Creation, Political Context and
De¤ nouement
A Polish Decree of 22 January 1946 delineated the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and
powers.12 Subsequent decrees were adopted inter alia on 17 October 194613
and 11 April 1947. The 17 October Decree extended the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal to all war criminals rendered to Poland for trial and also over alleged
war crimes regardless of where committed. Earlier decrees from 1944 and
1945 had elucidated what came to be the Tribunal’s substantive law of applica-
tion, as well as the law of application of other post-war courts (including ones
that proceeded summarily). Particularly noteworthy in this regard was a
Decree of 31 August 1944 (sierpnio¤ wka), promulgated by the Lublin Committee,
concerning the punishment of ‘fascist-Hitlerite criminals’ and ‘traitors to the
Polish nation’.14 This Decree was perfunctorily adopted shortly after the liber-
ation of some Polish territories yet before the emergence of the full-fledged
Communist state. The Lublin Committee, to be clear, declared itself in contra-
distinction to the Polish government in exile and was strongly supported by
the Soviet Union.15 Although Communist authorities in Poland began to re-
press many elements of what had hitherto been the Polish underground, their
recurrent deployment of language such as ‘enemies’ and the ‘Polish nation’
(understood in ethnic terms) reverts to terminology that the underground re-
sistance itself had used. Another decree, from 13 June 1946, was ominously
introduced as ‘concerning crimes particularly dangerous in the period of the
12 Rzeplin¤ ski observes that as early as 1940 the exiled Polish government (in London) approved of
‘hood courts’ attached to commanders of the Polish underground anti-German resistance. A.
Rzeplin¤ ski, ‘Prosecution of Nazi Crimes in Poland 1939-2004’, The First International Expert
Meeting on War Crimes, Genocide, and Crimes Against Humanity, organized by International
Criminal Police Organization ç Interpol General Secretariat (IPSG), held in Lyon, France
(23^25 March 2004), at 1. These ‘hood courts’ conducted secret proceedings, passed summary
sentences and could punish only by the death penalty. Connelly notes that these courts focused
on treason, a term that was deployed to describe those Poles who helped the enemy, rather
than merely referring to collaboration. J. Connelly, ‘Why the Poles Collaborated So Little ç
AndWhy that Is no Reason for Nationalist Hubris’, 64 Slavic Review (2005) 771, at 774.
13 This decree abolished the Special Criminal Courts for trial of alleged war criminals.
14 The Decree of 31 August 1944 (as modified, amended and jurisdictionally expanded) was even-
tually consolidated in a Schedule to the Proclamation of the Minister of Justice dated
11 December 1946. According to Rzeplin¤ ski (writing in 2004), the main provision of this
decree (Art. 1(1)) still remained in force in Poland, although as of 1 September 1998 the death
penalty had been replaced by life imprisonment. Rzeplin¤ ski, supra note 12, at 1 and notes 5
and 6.
15 Some members of the Polish government in exile joined the Lublin Committee by the end of
1944. After the Soviets entered Warsaw, the Lublin Committee was transformed into the
Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland. For comprehensive discussion of the stabil-
ization of power in the hands of Communist authorities, see generally Kersten, supra note 11.
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reconstruction of the State’.16 Krystyna Kersten fingers one of the major polit-
ical trials in Krako¤ w in 1947 as proceeding under this particular decree.17
All told, the substantive law applied by the Tribunal took the form of a hod-
gepodge of special decrees, pre-existing Polish municipal law, newly created
enactments, domesticated international norms and general principles of law,
the Hague Convention No. IV and the London Agreement ç understandable,
to be sure, in light of the lack of comprehensive law regarding war crimes,
crimes against humanity and crimes against the peace available at the time.18
The Chief Commission for the Examination of German Crimes in Poland over-
saw prosecutions.19 Although the Tribunal’s seat was in Warsaw, it conducted
some of its trials in other cities in Poland.While Tribunal verdicts were final,
the President of the National Council (and, subsequently, the President of
Poland) had a right to issue a pardon or to commute any sentence.
The Decree of 31August 1944 listed offences and identified modes of liability.
It also provided penalties, to wit, the death penalty (for certain crimes) and im-
prisonment up to 15 years or for life (for other crimes). Convicts also forfeited
their public and civic rights and were subject to the full confiscation of their
property.20 While it was intended for the confiscated property to return to the
original private party owner who had been dispossessed, such claims proved
difficult to establish; frankly, the state had limited interest in supporting
them.21 The property thereby remained with the Polish state. Governmental
takings as criminal punishment ç along with the evacuation of German or
Volksdeutsche populations throughout Eastern Europe ç ‘caused much eco-
nomic wealth to fall in the hands of the sequestering state’.22 On this latter
note, convictions of deemed traitors or collaborators under the Decree bol-
stered the Polish government’s push towards nationalization (including with-
out compensation).23
The creation of the Tribunal as a special enforcement mechanism under-
scored the extraordinary nature of the defendants’criminality. Although some
concerns arose over bias, victor’s justice, retroactivity and emaciated due
16 Law Reports, Annex, supra note 1, at 90.
17 Kersten, supra note 11, at 384^385.
18 In Ho« ss, the Prosecution additionally alleged that crimes committed against Soviet prisoners of
war violated the Geneva Convention Relative to Prisoners of War. Ho« ss Law Reports, supra
note 2, at 18.
19 Rzeplin¤ ski notes that the Commission was established by governmental decree of 10 November
1945.
20 A series of specific decrees and laws from 1944 to 1946 extended the confiscation and restitu-
tion regime. For details see S. Herman, ‘War Damage and Nationalization in Eastern Europe’,
16 Law and Contemporary Problems (1951) 498, at 508^509.
21 In the end, in Poland ‘of the bulk of properties seized, confiscated, or acquired under forced
transfers by the Nazi occupiers, little, in fact, was returned to the previous owners on the
pre-1939 basis’. Ibid., at 509.
22 Ibid., at 507.
23 Ibid., at 486 (noting that throughout Eastern Europe ‘‘‘war damage’’ moves away from ‘‘war
claims’’ and merges with the fundamental political considerations of the economies of
reconstruction’).
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process,24 the work of the Tribunal has nonetheless been lauded.25 Prusin, for
example, renders a favourable assessment of the quality of the Tribunal’s work
when placed within its historical and temporal context.26 He also underscores
that personnel associated with all branches of the Tribunal had ‘impressive’
professional credentials and, more importantly, were able to conduct their
work unmolested by governmental meddling.27
The favourable assessment of the Tribunal’s work when it came to high-
profile Nazis, however, belies the co-extensive, and deliberate, deployment of
its foundational instruments (in particular, the Decree of 31 August 1944) to
persecute persons whom the government ç starkly influenced by Stalin and
the Soviet Union ç determined to be political enemies (and to hamper socialist
reconstruction) even if they had served in the underground resistance during
the war.28 This one Decree thereby simultaneously served goals of transition
and repression; a judicial system that revealed a progressive face to the world,
in the form of theTribunal, flexed a coercive muscle at home in the form of spe-
cial summary courts bereft of due process. These summary courts, cloaked in
celerity and secrecy, served ominous and ulterior motives. To be clear: Polish
resistance pushed back not only against the Germans, but also against the
Soviets who occupied the eastern part of the country. During World War II,
German occupation encompassed 48% of the area of the pre-war Polish state
(inhabited by 22 million Polish citizens) while Soviet occupation in the east
swallowed the remaining 52% (inhabited by 13 million Polish citizens).29 This
partition was rendered in accordance with the German^Soviet Pact of
28 September 1939 (the second Molotov^Ribbentrop agreement, later breached
by Germany when it invaded the Soviet Union). Within the German-occupied
territories, a further division was effected between regions in the west, which
were directly incorporated into Germany in violation of international law, and
regions in central and south, which fell under a General Government intended
to serve as a protectorate but also constituting an occupation in flagrant viola-
tion of international law.30 Serious human rights abuses, along with acts of
24 M. Lippman, ‘Prosecutions of Nazi War Criminals Before Post-WorldWar II Domestic Tribunals’,
8 University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review (1999^2000) 1, at 11.
25 In Greiser’s case, see C. Epstein, Model Nazi: Arthur Greiser and the Occupation ofWestern Poland
(Oxford University Press, 2010), at 328.
26 Prusin, supra note 7, at abstract. He recognizes certain inequities, nevertheless, such as the fact
that the prosecution had greater resources than the defence, along with more time to present
and prepare the case. Ibid., at 17.
27 Ibid., at 5.
28 Kersten, supra note 11, at 108 (noting that the Decree of 31August’s application to traitors to the
Polish nation ‘subsumed prosecution of AK [n.b. the Home Army] soldiers and occupation-era
members of the underground authorities in the period 1944-1955’). In addition, civilians were
prosecuted for political crimes under the Criminal Code of the Polish Army.
29 Institute of National Remembrance, Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes Against the
Polish Nation, Public Education Office, The Destruction of the Polish Elite. Operation AB-Katyn
(2009), at 22, 25, 81 (noting that ‘repressive operations were preludes to Poland’s
Germanization on the one hand, and Sovietization on the other’).
30 Bu« hler Law Reports, supra note 5, at 23, note 1.
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resistance, occurred in both the German- and Soviet-occupied zones. The
Soviets utilized language such as ‘enemies of the state’ to target Polish officials,
many of whom were murdered (including most notoriously at Katyn).
The Tribunal delivered its first judgment on 7 July 1946 when it convicted
Arthur Greiser of membership in a criminal organization, aggressive war and
exceeding the rights accorded to the occupying power under international
law (in other words, war crimes and crimes against humanity). Although the
Greiser case centrally involved the charge of aggressive war, it also touched
upon the avidity of Germanization in what historian Wendy Lower calls the
‘Wild East’.31 The Greiser case narrated the German Drang nach Osten and the
terrors left in its wake. It connected the conquest of the Eastern living space
to something even more existential than aggressive war, namely, genocide. In
this regard, the Tribunal blazed a new path ç which continued in the Ho« ss
and Go« th judgments ç towards the imposition of penal responsibility for geno-
cide before the crime was formally recognized under international law. The
Tribunal, moreover, broadly conceived of genocide as imbricating physical, bio-
logical, spiritual and cultural aspects, including Nazi destruction, confiscation,
theft and seizure of cultural property, art and archives (whether publicly or pri-
vately held).
Historian Catherine Epstein remarks that ‘the Greiser indictment did not
ignore Holocaust crimes’, but it ‘subsumed the Final Solution under crimes
against the Polish people’.32 Germanization was seen as destroying the Polish
nation and the Jewish population.33 This approach also informed the Go« th and
Ho« ss cases, although less evidently, insofar as these two latter trials exposed
the horrors of the concentration camps and the targeting of European Jews.
Centralizing the narrative of Polish suffering at the hands of the Germans
served immediate political purposes for Polish post-war authorities.
The Tribunal was a specially created institution of primary jurisdiction that
dealt with only a small number of high-profile Nazi defendants. Other trials of
Nazis and collaborators were summarily conducted in common district courts
which retained residual jurisdiction and also in military courts.34 The stipu-
lated decrees also applied to these prosecutions,35 which continued for decades.
31 W. Lower, Hitler’s Furies: German Women in the Nazi Killing Fields (Harcourt, 2013).
Germanization also emerged as a theme in the Tribunal’s prosecution of Albert Forster, the
Gauleiter of Danzig^West Prussia and a rival to Greiser. Forster was convicted in 1948 in
Gdansk and executed in 1952.
32 Epstein, supra note 25, at 317.
33 Cf. Bu« hler Law Reports, supra note 5, at 34 (the Government-General ‘gave rise in fact, as was
intended, to mass criminality indulged in by German officials and functionaries against the in-
dividuals, and the Polish and Jewish nations as a whole’).
34 Rzeplin¤ ski, supra note 12, at 1 (‘Special Criminal Courts were established on12 September 1944,
each composed of a professional judge and two lay judges, to try Nazi crimes, which were
called in Poland, until late 1990s, ‘‘Hitlerite crimes’’. Those were summary courts. On
17 October 1946 their powers were taken over by common courts, but they continued to sit as
summary courts.’)
35 ‘As regards war crimes cases, all these courts apply the same substantive law as laid down in
the Decree of 31st August, 1944’. Law Reports, Annex, supra note 1, at 97.
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All told, Rzeplin¤ ski cites sources that by the end of December 1977 at least
17,919 persons were convicted under the decree, ‘[a]bout 1/3 [of whom] were
Germans, Austrians and the so-called Volksdeutsche’.36 Rzeplin¤ ski also deter-
mines that ‘[a]bout 95% of all investigations into Nazi crimes and other war
crimes concern victims of Polish nationality’.37 A separate prosecutorial office
was established in the year 2000 (following post-Communist transition). By
early 2004, this office had ‘conducted 1295 investigations, including 335 ::: in
Nazi crime cases, 878 ::: in Communist crimes cases, and 82 ::: in cases con-
cerning other crimes ::: ’.38
The Tribunal’s vision ç to which it closely hewed ç of transitional justice
was one that highlighted Polish victimization and German oppression. The
Tribunal’s justice, to be clear, was selective justice: it prosecuted Nazi crimes
alone. Other injustices, however, also roiled war-time Poland. Left off the
Tribunal’s discursive frame were Russian and Soviet crimes, along with
human rights abuses perpetrated by Poles against Jews. On this latter note, as-
sessment of Polish criminality would have fit uneasily with the Tribunal’s over-
arching purpose. The Tribunal’s narrative, however assiduously assembled,
was nonetheless coarsened by a few other cases brought against individual
Poles in Polish courts. Although not involving the foundational decrees, these
cases (notably implicating the Jedwabne massacre)39 brought to light instances
of Polish complicity and initiation of anti-Jewish pogroms. One view among
historians is that Polish collaboration (described by the underground resist-
ance as treason) was quite limited, with Connelly emphasizing that the Nazis
unleashed their ‘fantastic brutality’ upon Poland because of ‘the Polish refusal
to collaborate’.40 This view however, is perturbed by the vivid debates that per-
sist on this topic. Connelly himself notes that ‘remarkably little’ is known
‘about the thorniest of all issues in recent Polish history, namely Polish compli-
city in the Holocaust of Jews’.41
Soviet crimes were systemic and extensive. Public discussion of these crimes
was nonetheless not countenanced at the time. Any such discussion would
36 Rzeplin¤ ski, supra note 12, at 3 (Rzeplin¤ ski mentions here a Decree of 31 December 1944, al-
though I am uncertain whether this refers to another decree, or is simply a transcription
error and the reference is meant to be to the Decree of 31 August 1944). In 1991, prosecutorial
responsibilities were expanded to include Stalinist crimes committed in Poland between 1944
and 1956. Ibid., at 3, note 12. See also Prusin, supra note 7, at 1^2 (‘[A]mong the former Soviet
satellites, Poland was the most consistent in investigating and prosecuting war crimes: between
1944 and 1985, Polish courts tried more than 20,000 defendants, including 5,450 German na-
tionals. The post-Communist Polish justice system has continued the work of prosecuting war
crimes; by February 2004 it had investigated 335 cases.’)
37 Rzeplin¤ ski, supra note 12, at 3.
38 Ibid. For extensive discussion of these investigations in the case of Nazi crimes, see ibid., at
4^12.
39 The Verdict of Circuit Court in Lomza (16^17 May 1949) (involving the Jedwabne massacre of
1941).
40 Connelly, supra note 12, at 773 (italics omitted).
41 Ibid., at 779.
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have resulted in severe sanction. It is only in recent decades, after the transi-
tion from Soviet domination, that an aperture has opened to address account-
ability for these abuses.
In sum, then, among the institutions that enforced the 1944 Decree (as sub-
sequently consolidated), the Tribunal was the most transparent, judicious and
attentive to due process concerns. Prusin concludes that the Tribunal: ‘[S]tood
apart from the special penal courts, which operated on the Stalinist model
and purged the regime’s political opponents in numerous show trials. ::: [T]he
[Tribunal] did not adjudicate a single case pertaining to the ‘‘fascistization of
the country’’.’42
The Tribunal was composed of quality personnel coming from the many di-
verse strands of Polish political life at the time. Hence, the institution was pol-
itically balanced and professionally pedigreed. This composition was
intentional. The Polish government wished in the immediate post-war period
to show the West, and the world, that Polish justice was civilized justice.
Hence, the Polish government was willing to give the Tribunal a robust
margin of appreciation in its work and considerable discretion, which enabled
it to adhere to a legalist agenda, build public support, and impress foreigners.
TheTribunal’s work also helped remind the public that ‘only a unified Polish so-
ciety, led by the new government in alliance with the USSR, could effectively
thwart the ‘‘German menace’’’.43
This moment, however, soon faded. The initial ferment of the post-war
Communist transition gave way to a more monolithic regime that deprioritized
Nazi prosecutions. Polish authorities fixated on perceived political opponents
instead of judicial accountability for erstwhile Nazi oppressors. Polish authori-
ties became less concerned with Western perceptions. The Tribunal’s political
usefulness tapered off. It was disbanded in 1948 despite the fact that it was
still preparing future cases against major war criminals.44 Its jurisdiction was
reassigned to the regional courts.45 Some distinguished Tribunal members
even fell into disfavour with the Polish government. Greiser’s defence lawyer,
who had conducted himself with great integrity as an official of the court,
was ‘subjected to a vicious slander campaign ::: [when] the secret police
focused attention on [his] ‘‘bourgeois’’ credentials’; ultimately, ‘[h]is apartment
was confiscated and he was forced to terminate his law practice’.46
Mieczyslaw Siewierski, one of the leading prosecutors (who participated in
42 Prusin, supra note 7, at 5.
43 Ibid., at 18.
44 P. Grzebyk, ‘The Role of the Supreme National Tribunal of Poland in the Development of
Principles of International Criminal Law’ (2014) (on file with the author), at 7 (noting the in-
tention to prosecute those responsible for the destruction of Warsaw and the demolition of the
Warsaw ghetto). Grzebyk also points to the dissipating likelihood of Western states extraditing
an accused to a state now behind the Iron Curtain as among the reasons why the Tribunal
was disbanded.
45 Prusin comments that the termination of the Tribunal ‘signaled that the Communists had
assumed total control over the country’. Prusin, supra note 7, at 19.
46 Ibid.
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the Go« th case, among others) fared worse. He was ‘charged under the terms of
the August Decree with the ‘‘fascistization of the country’’ and sentenced to
five years’ imprisonment’.47 While the Tribunal’s work ended in 1948, prosecu-
tions of political opponents conducted under the auspices of the initial 1944
Decree continued thereafter. These foundational instruments were not re-
pealed when the Tribunal was dismantled.
The role of the Polish courts, nevertheless, eventually morphed ç albeit
slightly ç yet again. The foundations laid by the 1944 Decree as concatenated
also helped facilitate the eventual investigation of select state crimes com-
mitted by the secret police between1944 and1955. In some instances, these in-
vestigations implicated the very ‘Stalinist’ torturers who had turned to the
1944 Decree to torment perceived opponents. The Polish case study, therefore,
reveals law’s malleability and capacity for shape shifting. Law’s source does
not preordain its destiny; its start does not dictate where it stays.
3. Go« th Case
Amon Leopold Go« th was commandant of the forced labour camp at Plaszo¤ w
(Krako¤ w) between 11 February 1943 and 13 September 1944. He also was a
member of two recognized criminal organizations: the NSDAP (Nazi Party)48
and the Waffen SS. In addition to having ‘personally issued orders to deprive
of freedom, ill-treat and exterminate individuals and whole groups of people’,
Go« th also was accused of having himself ‘murdered, injured and ill-treated
Jews and Poles as well as people of other nationalities’.49 Go« th was the
Tribunal’s second trial. Many decades later, Go« th was portrayed by Ralph
Fiennes in Steven Spielberg’s film Schindler’s List as ‘an irrational, sadistic mon-
ster who took pleasure in personally inflicting torture’.50 Fiennes was
nominated for an Academy Award and won a BAFTA Award for Best
Supporting Actor for his role. Jews ‘saved’ by Schindler’s intervention later ren-
dered accounts of Go« th’s cruelty. In 2008, a documentary entitled Inheritance
featured a poignant meeting between Go« th’s daughter Monika (who was one-
year old when Go« th died) and Helen Jonas, one of his servants who survived
his brutalities.51
47 Ibid.
48 Go« th became a member of the Nazi Party in Austria in 1932.
49 Go« th Law Reports, supra note 3, at 1.
50 L. Rees, ‘Rudolf Ho« ss ç Commandant of Auschwitz’ (on file with the author, last updated
17 February 2011).
51 H. Havrilesky, ‘‘‘Your father was a monster’’’, Salon, 10 December 2008 (on file with the author).
In 2002, Monika published her memoirs, which she entitled But I Have to Love my Father, Don’t
I? (translated from the original German). Monika’s daughter Jennifer Teege published a book in
2013, which she titled My Grandfather Would Have Shot Me (translated from the original
German).
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Go« th, an Austrian national born inVienna on 11 December 1908, faced mul-
tiple charges in his indictment.52 First, in his capacity as commandant of the
Plaszo¤ w forced labour camp, he was accused of causing the death of ‘about
8,000 inmates by ordering a large number of them to be exterminated’.53 Go« th
‘governed [this] camp in a calculated brutal manner, and for the slightest of
complaint, he fired at prisoners, selected by him, himself, or he ordered others
to do this, or conducted public hangings’.54 Secondly, as SS-Sturmfu« hrer he
was accused of having carried out the ‘final closing down of the Cracow
ghetto’, a liquidation action that began on 13 March 1943 and which ‘deprived
of freedom about 10,000 people who had been interned in the camp at
Plaszo¤ w, and caused the death of about 2,000’.55 The Krako¤ w ghetto was set
up on 21 March 1941 and initially contained 68,000 residents.56 The notes on
the Go« th case provide considerable detail on the events that preceded the estab-
lishment of this ghetto and the progressive restrictions imposed on Jewish resi-
dents, including Go« th’s role in ordering and himself shooting many victims.
Purges of ghetto residents occurred systematically, presaging the final liquid-
ation.57 Thirdly, Go« th was charged with demolishing the Tarno¤ w ghetto, also
in Krako¤ w district, as a result of which ‘an unknown number of people per-
ished’.58 The fourth accusation against Go« th involved his role in shuttering
the forced labour camp at Szebnie ‘by ordering the inmates to be murdered on
the spot or deported to other camps, thus causing the deaths of several thou-
sand persons’.59 In addition to this litany of criminality, Go« th was accused of
extensive property infractions. Of note, furthermore, is the general part of the
indictment that charged Go« th with criminal membership in the Nazi Party
and theWaffen SS.
Go« th was arrested by the SS police in Krako¤ w on 13 September 1944, effect-
ively ending his career. Go« th had fraudulently misappropriated considerable
inmate property for personal use, rather than confiscating it for official Reich
purposes. He thereby amassed a fortune. Moreover, Go« th’s cruelties were so ex-
cessive that they flouted SS regulations regarding how a labour camp was to
operate. He was so violent and rash with his own staff (he killed SS men) that
his superiors became concerned.60 Go« th’s arrest by the SS demonstrates the
Nazi tendency not to favour sadists or persons who zealously killed for their
own personal enrichment. SS doctors reportedly diagnosed Go« th with mental
52 The Indictment against Go« th was filed with the Tribunal on 30 July 1946, this being two
months before the pronouncement of the Nuremberg judgment.
53 Go« th Law Reports, supra note 3, at 1.
54 Holocaust Education & Archive Research Team,TheTrial of Amon Go« th, at 6 of print-out (here-
inafter ‘Holocaust Education Research’).
55 Go« th Law Reports, supra note 3, at 1. Go« th was known as the ‘butcher of Plaszo¤ w’.
56 Ibid., at 2.
57 Ibid., at 3.
58 Ibid., at 1.
59 Ibid.
60 Holocaust Education Research, supra note 54, at 16 of print-out (‘The accusations laid against
Go« th, paradoxically included the fact that he treated the prisoners brutally, well beyond the
SS regulations as laid down by the SS high command.’)
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illness ç he was arrested by the US military in May 1945 while in a sanitar-
ium in Germany.61
Go« th lorded over the Plaszo¤ w camp. He ostentatiously discarded any pre-
tence of rules or regulations.62 He was reportedly always intoxicated; he had a
series of mistresses, who at times intervened to stop him from killing or further
beating detainees;63 he forced prostitution and imposed sexualized terror at
the camp.64 According to trial witnesses, he organized ‘orgies’ at his villa. He
reportedly shot inmates from his balcony if they were moving too slowly or
resting; he abused his staff, including servants and cooks, on the slightest pre-
text (i.e. the soup being too hot); and his dogs mauled detainees. He inflicted
collective punishments upon prisoner work teams for a perceived infraction
committed by one individual member.
Although arrested by the SS police, Go« th was never prosecuted or investi-
gated ç apparently because of the ‘collapsing fortunes of Germany’ at the
time.65 He was captured by the Americans and subsequently extradited to
Poland. The witnesses before the Tribunal delivered extensive testimony about
Go« th’s conduct in the labour camps which recounted innumerable gratuitous
barbarities.66
The Go« th trial jointly highlighted the extermination of the Jewish population
and the suffering of Poles. The Prosecution placed Go« th’s conduct squarely
within the context of the progressive persecution of European Jews orche-
strated by the Nazi regime, which began with the imposition of personal and
economic restrictions on the Jewish population.67 The culmination of these ef-
forts, to be sure, was the systematic concentration of the Jewish population ‘in
a small number of towns in order to achieve complete control over them and
to facilitate their removal to death camps’68 and, then, the crushing operation
of those death camps. At the time, therefore, one important contribution of
the Go« th trial was to clarify the obvious, namely, that the pogroms against the
Jewish community served no military objective and, hence, constituted some-
thing other than the war effort. Decades later, and on another continent,
when Rwandan defendants argued that the massacre of all Tutsi (men,
women and children) was undertaken in self-defence against an active military
threat, a similar distinction was drawn between genocide and the war effort.
61 D. McKale, Nazis after Hitler: How Perpetrators of the Holocaust Cheated Justice (Rowman &
Littlefield, 2012), at 201.
62 Holocaust Education Research, supra note 54, at 7 of print-out.
63 One of his longer term mistresses, Ruth Kalder, first met Go« th when she worked as a secretary
at Schindler’s enamelware factory in Krako¤ w. Ruth was Monika’s mother. See supra note 51.
64 ‘Chairman: What does the witness know about the ‘‘Merry House’’? Witness: The accused
ordered the selection from among the female prisoners, of several Polish girls, who were accom-
modated separately, in a special barrack, where only SS men had access to, and also the
Ukrainians, to satisfy their sexual needs.’ Holocaust Education Research, supra note 54, at 30 of
print-out.
65 Ibid., at 3 of print-out.
66 Ibid., at 7, 18 and 32 of print-out.
67 Go« th Law Reports, supra note 3, at 2.
68 Ibid., at 3.
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Go« th pleaded not guilty. He was represented by two Tribunal-appointed at-
torneys. His trial was held at Krako¤ w between 27 and 31 August and 2 and 5
September 1946.
The evidence against Go« th was overwhelming. It included witnesses (mostly
former detainees of the ghettos and camps), expert evidence as to the Nazi poli-
cies, and also erudite legal testimony regarding the content of international
criminal law.69 Go« th was found guilty of the charged crimes, a ‘large number
[of which] has been committed on the accused’s own initiative’; he was also
convicted of ordering crimes (a more typical charge for higher level defend-
ants).70 For a senior perpetrator, Go« th’s convictions for homicide and himself
personally killing, shooting, maiming and torturing were notable in that they
indicate his disposition as an unstable sadist, in contrast to the disposition of
other leading Nazis, such as Ho« ss, reputed for mass murder by detached, me-
ticulous and punctilious performance of administrative and bureaucratic
duties.71 While new research suggests that administrative massacre may not
be as banally bureaucratic as Hannah Arendt had famously posited in the
case of Adolf Eichmann,72 the contrast between Ho« ss and Go« th remains evi-
dent.73 It is noteworthy that, according to the reports, the Tribunal early on
recognized the peculiarity of administrative massacre. The report on the
Tribunal’s condemnation of Josef Bu« hler, who served as the deputy to
Governor-General Hans Frank in the Government-General, for example indi-
cate that:
In the words of the ::: Tribunal, Bu« hler was a type of war criminal who did not directly
commit any common crime himself, but one who sitting comfortably in his cabinet office,
took part in the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity by directing and
supervising the actual perpetrators, and by providing them with the useful instrument of
69 Ibid., at 4.
70 Ibid., at 10. Go« th’s convictions for directly and personally murdering and torturing massive
numbers of prisoners were based on extensive witness testimony.‘Go« th very often fired through
the windows into the barracks, killing prisoners, with his own hands, beating prisoners with
his whip, until they were unconscious, as well as systematically sentencing people to be
whipped, across a bare back 25 or 50 times, in front of groups of people. Hanging by the
arms, detention in bunkers, ravaging by dogs, these were the methods in daily use and applica-
tion of the accused.’ Holocaust Education Research, supra note 54, at 7 of print-out.
71 See e.g. Rees, supra note 50 (‘There is no record of [Ho« ss] ever hitting ç let alone killing ç
anyone. :::According to Whitney Harris, the American prosecutor who interrogated him at
the Nuremberg trials, Rudolph Ho« ss appeared ‘‘normal’’, ‘‘like a grocery clerk’’. And former pris-
oners who encountered him at Auschwitz confirmed this view, adding that Ho« ss always ap-
peared calm and collected’).
72 B. Stangneth, Eichmann Before Jerusalem: The Unexamined Life of a Mass Murderer (trans. R.
Martin, Knopf, 2014) (arguing that the image of the cautious bureaucrat was deliberately circu-
lated by Eichmann as a defence strategy at trial and that Arendt uncritically accepted this as
actual rather than pre-textual).
73 That said, as detailed in his personal memoirs, in1923 Ho« ss was imprisoned for six years (albeit
sentenced to10) in Germany for having, after a night of heavy drinking, murdered a man deter-
mined to be a traitor by the paramilitary right-wing Freikorps (German Free Corps) movement
of which Ho« ss was a member. Groups such as the Freikorps were responsible for sowing consid-
erable unrest during the Weimar Republic and also for a number of political assassinations.
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administrative and legal measures; he was the chief engineer of the complicated and wide-
spread criminal machinery, who guided thousands of the willing tools in how to use it.74
TheTribunal rejected Go« th’s defences (superior orders, military necessity and
jurisdictional submissions regarding the applicability of the declared law) and
sentenced him to death.75 The Tribunal additionally ‘pronounced the loss of
public and civic rights, and forfeiture of all [his] property’.76 The President of
the State National Council did not grant Go« th’s appeal for mercy. Remorseless
to the end, Go« th was executed, by hanging, in Plaszo¤ w on 13 September 1946,
roughly within a week of his conviction but two years (to the date) following
his arrest by the SS. His final words were ‘Heil Hitler’. His body was cremated;
his ashes thrown into the Vistula River.77
Two aspects of the Go« th proceedings are jurisprudentially noteworthy. These
are: first, the charges relating to membership in criminal organizations (the
Nazi Party and the Waffen SS); and, secondly, the explicit deployment of the
term genocide in the proceedings and judgment.
At the time Go« th’s indictment was lodged with the Tribunal, the Nuremberg
judgment had not yet been issued. The Polish war crimes legislation, moreover,
lacked provisions that related to membership of criminal organizations (these
provisions were promulgated for the first time in a Decree of 10 December
1946 that formed part of the multi-layered corpus that grounded the
Tribunal’s activities). The report on the Go« th case emphasizes that the Polish
Prosecution pursued a broad interpretation of the Nazi Party’s criminal charac-
ter.78 Whereas the Polish Prosecutor characterized the criminal activities of
the Nazi party as intending ‘through violence, aggressive wars and other
crimes, at world domination and establishment of the national-socialist re-
gimes’, the Nuremberg tribunal declared the Nazi Party and the Waffen SS to
be criminal within the scope of the Nuremberg Charter, that is, ‘in war crimes
and crimes against humanity connected with the war’.79 The Polish Tribunal
for its part opined that the Nazi Party was a criminal organization based on
its commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and established
the facts of Go« th’s participation therein. The Tribunal’s conclusion was largely
congruent with that of the IMT (released shortly thereafter). That said, insofar
74 Bu« hler Law Reports, supra note 5, at 35.
75 The Decree of 31 August 1944 precluded superior orders and duress from evacuating criminal
responsibility. Following Go« th’s conviction, the consolidating decree of 10 December 1946 in
Art. 5(1) stipulated: ‘The fact that an act or omission was caused by a threat or order, or arose
out of obligation under municipal law does not exempt from criminal responsibility.’ As to
military necessity, it is reported that ‘the Tribunal :::disregarded this plea. The accused :::had
committed acts without any military justification and in flagrant violation of the rights of the
inhabitants of the occupied territory as protected by the laws and customs of war and, there-
fore, the defence of military necessity was neither applicable nor admissible.’ Go« th Law
Reports, supra note 3, at 10.
76 Ibid., at 4.
77 Holocaust Education Research, supra note 54, at 43 of print-out.
78 Go« th Law Reports, supra note 3, at 5.
79 Ibid., at 6 (noting also that the Nuremberg Charter additionally referenced crimes against
peace).
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as the Tribunal’s sentence was pronounced on 5 September 1946, it lacked a
‘formal legal basis either in municipal or international law on which it could
base a penalty for the membership in a criminal organization’.80 Even setting
aside this legal murkiness, however, the report on the Go« th case mentions
that it is factually unclear whether the nature of Go« th’s membership in the
Nazi Party was such that penal responsibility should ensue therefrom. Insofar
as Go« th held ‘no party office of any kind, did not belong to the Leadership
Corps of the Nazi party which alone has been declared criminal by the
Nuremberg Judgment, and was merely an ordinary member of the party ::: [h]is
membership as such in this organization was therefore not criminal’.81
Membership simpliciter would not suffice. On the other hand, according to the
report of the case, there was no doubt that the accused’s membership in the
Waffen SS was ‘definitely criminal’.82
Similar ambiguities regarding criminal organization and group membership
resurfaced in the Ho« ss case. In short, although the criminal membership provi-
sions were designed to expedite convictions by avoiding sequential litigation,
individual trials and repetitive pleadings, these provisions actually proved to
be rather controversial and, in this regard, consumed the very judicial re-
sources they were intended to economize.83 Subsequent developments in inter-
national criminal law, however, have not fared much better in grappling with
the conundrum of organizational criminality. Vivid debates continue to erupt
today over joint criminal enterprise and other accessorial modes of liability.
Nor have debates fared any better at the national level, where debates over
criminal membership in declared terrorist organizations, for example, continue
to bedevil domestic prosecutors and judges alike. The Tribunal, nonetheless,
boldly attempted to render collective criminality intelligible to a system of
criminal law predicated on individual intent, agency and culpability.
The second jurisprudential novelty stemming from the Go« th case involves
the application of the crime of genocide. Today, the crime of genocide is well es-
tablished in international law. This crime prohibits a series of violent acts in-
tended to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group as such. In the late 1940s, however, genocide was not yet formally an
international crime. Raphael Lemkin conjured the neologism and added it
to the popular lexicon only in 1944. Unsurprisingly, then, the Polish Decrees
(as amended and consolidated) proscribed war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity. Go« th was charged with these offences. The Prosecution, how-
ever, ‘went :::a step further on the road of the development of the
international criminal law and described these offences also as the crime of
80 Ibid. (noting however that ‘[t]his declaration was in accordance with the trend of legal thought




83 See discussion infra. The Tribunal’s judgments in Fischer and Leist (1947) and in Bu« hler (1948)
also discuss membership in criminal groups, in those instances, the General Government estab-
lished by the Germans in occupied Poland.
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genocide ::: ’.84 In this regard, as in Greiser, the Polish cases edgily advanced the
frame of international law. The report of the Go« th case discusses Lemkin’s coin-
age of the genocide neologism,85 suggesting this Polish scholar’s transformative
contribution. Similarly to the submissions regarding criminal organization,
the Polish Prosecution endeavoured to surpass the scope of the language de-
ployed at the IMT proceedings, which conceived of genocide only in the phys-
ical and biological sense. Polish prosecutors instead intended to appreciate
genocide’s economic, social and cultural connotations. Unlike the experiences
with criminal organization, however, here the Tribunal explicitly accepted the
Prosecution’s submissions (this move also can be juxtaposed with the approach
of the Nuremberg judges, who did not deploy the term genocide in their even-
tual judgment). The judges in the Go« th case determined that the ‘wholescale ex-
termination of Jews and also of Poles had all the characteristics of genocide in
the biological meaning of this term, and embraced in addition the destruction
of the cultural life of these nations’.86 In this vein, the Go« th judgment reinserts
the violence against the Polish population as a central concern and posits
Poles as the targets of genocidal violence, thereby returning to the narrative
circulated in the Greiser case. However awkwardly, at the time Polish Jews
were classed as Jews (based on religion or race), while Poles not identified as
Jews were classed as Polish (based on nationality). The genocide of the Polish
nation may have been co-extensive with the Holocaust, but it was posited as a
horror that was quite independent in nature. The Go« th judgment, while detail-
ing the industrialization of genocidal violence against Jews, also ç according
to the report on the case ç wryly noted that this architecture (including the
camps) ‘afforded an excellent opportunity as instruments used for extermin-
ation of Poles’.87
4. Ho« ss Case
The proceedings against Obersturmbannfu« hrer Rudolf Franz Ferdinand Ho« ss, a
notorious Kommandant of the Auschwitz concentration camp, were held in
March 1947. The Ho« ss trial, the Tribunal’s fourth, post-dated both Greiser and
Go« th. Ho« ss’ diary entries were subsequently translated and published in his
well-known memoirs, which evoke the mind and mannerisms of an architect
of such overwhelming tragedy.88
84 Go« th Law Reports, supra note 3, at 7 (italics in original).
85 Ibid. (albeit limiting it to ‘the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group’).
86 Ibid., at 9 (judgment cited).
87 Ibid.
88 R. Ho« ss, Death Dealer: The Memoirs of the SS Kommandant at Auschwitz (ed. S. Paskuly, trans. A.
Pollinger, and published with a foreward by Primo Levi, da Capo Press, 1992) (hereinafter
‘Ho« ss, Memoirs’). Ho« ss was encouraged to write his memoirs by Jan Sehn, prosecuting attorney
for the PolishWar Crimes Commission; Ho« ss did so in part to recollect events for the strategic
purpose of his trial. See Ho« ss, Memoirs, ibid., at 19 (of Paskuly introduction).
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Ho« ss served as Auschwitz Kommandant from 1 May 1940 until 1 December
1943; he subsequently served as Head of the DI Department (responsible for
the concentration camps) of the SS Central Economic and Administrative
Office (December 1943^May 1945) and commander of the SS garrison at
Auschwitz in the summer of 1944 (the time period where a very large number
of Hungarian Jews were deported to Auschwitz and murdered). The
Prosecution submitted that after Ho« ss left the post of Auschwitz Kommandant
he ‘fulfilled ::: the functions of Himmler’s special plenipotentiary for extermin-
ation of Jews and in that capacity he either sent people to Auschwitz or super-
vised the extermination on the spot’.89
At the end of the war Ho« ss went into hiding. He obtained a new identity as a
farm labourer in northern Germany. Ho« ss managed to live undetected for
eight months, during which time he frequently visited his nearby family. The
British eventually caught Ho« ss, tortured him and then handed him off to the
Poles. Ho« ss noted that upon his arrival in Krako¤ w he had to wait at the train
station where a crowd spotted Go« th as among the group of Germans present;
Ho« ss wrote that ‘[i]f the car had not arrived when it did, we would have been
bombarded with stones’.90 Ho« ss also testified at the IMT proceedings, where
he was called as a defence witness by Ernst Kaltenbrunner (the former head
of Reich main security). In a nod to the IMT’s iconicity, Ho« ss’cameo appearance
as a witness at Nuremberg has received as much, if not more, play than his
trial and conviction before the Tribunal.
While at Auschwitz, Ho« ss ‘lived with his wife and four children in a house
just yards from the crematorium :::’.91 One of his daughters, now residing in
the United States, remembers Ho« ss fondly as a father, describing him as ‘the
nicest man in the world ::: [h]e was very good to us’ and recalling their eating
together, playing in the garden at Auschwitz (and the other camps at which
he worked) and also reading Hansel and Gretel.92 Ho« ss, too, often spoke and
wrote lovingly of his family. He was deeply committed to his wife and children.
One of his regrets was that working so hard to fulfil his genocidal obligations
detracted from the time he could spend with his family ç an outlandish
lament. Ho« ss was motored by duty: for him, running the camp was an admin-
istrative task. He emphasized diligence rather than zeal among his staff.93 In
89 Ho« ss Law Reports, supra note 2, at 13.
90 Ho« ss, Memoirs, supra note 88, at 181.
91 Rees, supra note 50. See also T. Harding, ‘Hiding in N. Virginia, a daughter of Auschwitz’,
Washington Post, 7 September 2013 (‘[T]he Ho« ss family lived in a two-story gray stucco villa
on the edge of Auschwitz ç so close you could see the prisoner blocks and old crematorium
from the upstairs window. ::: The family decorated their home with furniture and artwork
stolen from prisoners as they were selected for the gas chambers. It was a life of luxury
taking place only a few short steps from horror and torment’). Ho« ss confided in a psychologist
that his sex life suffered once his wife found out ‘about what he was doing’ at the camp. G.
Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary (Farrar, Straus, 1961), at 238.
92 Harding, ibid.
93 Lower reports that Ho« ss’ reaction to the appointment of Johanna Langefeld, the first female
superintendant of Birkenau, was negative owing to his sense that Langefeld was ‘too assertive’.
Lower, supra note 31, at 109.
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his forward to Ho« ss’ memoirs, noted author and Holocaust survivor Primo Levi
identifies as believable Ho« ss’claim that ‘he never enjoyed inflicting pain or kill-
ing: he was no sadist, he had nothing of the satanist’.94
Ho« ss’memoirs, burdened by his bland prose, also burgeon with vulgar details
as to how and why he ended up playing a catalytic role in the Nazi death ma-
chinery. He notes the unstinting obedience demanded of him by his austere
and religious father, a trait that Ho« ss internalized and which informed his
membership in and promotions within the Nazi hierarchy. Ho« ss describes him-
self as a loner. Prior to setting up Auschwitz, Ho« ss had served at the
Sachsenhausen camp (as of 1936) and previous to that at Dachau (where he
quickly rose from being a guard in 1934 to Rapportfuehrer). He had joined the
Nazi party in 1922 and the SS in 1934. Like Greiser, Ho« ss has been described
as a ‘model’ Nazi and SS man.95
The proceedings against Ho« ss, beginning with the indictment, unravelled
horrific details of the Auschwitz death camp, described in the report on the
case as occupying ‘the most prominent position among the nine greatest con-
centration camps established by Nazi Germany’.96 In this regard, the Ho« ss pro-
ceedings fulfilled an expressive function. It did so alongside the British Belsen
trial, (which involved many Auschwitz guards, subsequent Auschwitz trials
held in Frankfurt,West Germany, in the 1960s, and the 2015 conviction of 94-
year-old Oskar Gro« ning, Auschwitz’s bookkeeper, in Germany on charges of
serving as accessory to the murder of over 300,000 inmates (mostly
Hungarian Jews). In particular, the Ho« ss trial detailed the grisly medical experi-
ments performed at the camp. Ho« ss also laid some groundwork for the
Tribunal’s subsequent prosecution of 40 Auschwitz officials (including another
commandant, Artur Liebehenschel) held in Krako¤ w late in 1947 and as a
result of which slightly over half of the defendants received death sentences.
Polish prosecutors charged Ho« ss, a German national, with membership of
the Nazi Party (in Germany and also in the occupied territory of Poland) and,
like Go« th, with membership in the Waffen SS (although in the Ho« ss case, spe-
cific allegations were put forth involving the Nazi Party alone).97 He also was
indicted for his role at Auschwitz where he ‘supervised’ the ‘Nazi system of per-
secution and extermination of nations in concentration and death
camps ::: against the Polish and Jewish civilian population and against other
nationals of the territories occupied by Germany, as well as to Soviet prisoners
of war ::: ’.98 The accusations against Ho« ss were staggering in terms of their
enormity: depriving 300,000 camp registered inmates of life, along with
4,000,000 people (‘mainly Jews’) brought to the camp and 12,000 Soviet
94 Ho« ss, Memoirs, supra note 88, at 4 (of Levi foreward). Elsewhere, however, Levi discusses how
elements of the book are deceitful.
95 Rees, supra note 50. See also Tenenbaum, supra note 2, at 226 (‘Ho« ss was rather intimate with
Eichmann and they met frequently in good fellowship and bouts of conviviality’). For discus-
sion of contacts between Eichmann and Ho« ss, see Stangneth, supra note 72, at 5, 35, 49 and169.
96 Ho« ss Law Reports, supra note 2, at 12.
97 Ibid., at 18.
98 Ibid., at 11.
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prisoners of war.99 It was alleged that these individuals were deprived of life ‘by
asphyxiation in gas-chambers, shooting, hanging, lethal injections of phenol
or by medical experiments causing death, systematic starvation, by creating
special conditions in the camp which were causing a high rate of mortality,
by excessive work of the inmates, and by other methods’.100 The Prosecution
noted that while at Auschwitz Ho« ss ‘perfected’ the ‘system’ that ‘was built on
patterns established in other concentration camps’.101 In addition, Ho« ss was in-
dicted with ill-treating and torturing these inmates ‘physically and morally’
and also with supervising ‘wholescale robbery of property, mostly jewels,
clothes and other valuable articles taken from people on their arrival to the
camp, and of gold teeth and fillings extracted from dead bodies of the vic-
tims’.102 Hair was sheared from the corpses of women and used inter alia to
manufacture felt (deployed for industrial purposes, hats and stockings worn
by Reich railway employees ‘to keep their feet warm’).103 The property crimes
officially undertaken by the Nazis against the Jewish inmates were colossal in
scale, but were hampered by theft and larceny perpetrated by individual
guards and officers for their own personal gain. Ho« ss was very concerned
that his subordinates were skimming from what the Nazis had stolen for offi-
cial Reich use.
Ho« ss transformed Auschwitz from a ‘poorly-resourced but brutal concentra-
tion camp for Poles’ to ‘a source of slave labour’ and then readied it for Soviet
prisoners of war, who began to arrive in July 1941, and who were among the
first to be murdered through the use of Zyklon B gas.104 Ho« ss found that the
use of gas and crematoria mitigated the psychological harm to his staff in ef-
fecting such massive numbers of killings, and he assiduously expanded this
part of the camp’s architecture. Ho« ss himself was squeamish about seeing
people suffer and die. Acting at the suggestion of his associate, Karl Fritsch,
Ho« ss pioneered the use of the cyanide-based insecticide Zyklon B in the
camps, which he favoured over exhaust gas which had initially been conceived
as the method of choice in the death chambers. The result was a more efficient
method of killing.
Ho« ss’ trial was held inWarsaw between 11 and 29 March 1947. He was found
guilty and was sentenced to death by hanging. The execution took place on
16 April 1947 at a gallows adjacent to the Auschwitz crematorium (in the
‘Death Block’of the camp where inmates had been executed).
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid., at 13. The report on the case notes that Ho« ss ‘underwent special training in camp duties
and practiced in this respect in the Dachau and Sachsenhausen concentration camps, before
he took over the commandant’s duties at Auschwitz’. Ibid.
102 Ibid., at 12. An order from Himmler (23 September 1940) stipulated that gold be extracted
from the teeth of inmates murdered in the concentration camps and then used for the benefit
of the Reich.
103 Tenenbaum, supra note 2, at 223, note 33.
104 See Rees, supra note 50.
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As with Go« th, the Tribunal pronounced the loss of Ho« ss’ public/civic rights
and the forfeiture of all of his property. Ho« ss was represented at trial by two at-
torneys. He more-or-less admitted all the facts alleged in the indictment.
Although Hoss denied that he personally committed any acts of ill-treatment
or cruelty and questioned the accuracy of the total number of persons alleged
to have been killed in Auschwitz, he ‘recognized his entire responsibility for
everything that occurred in the camp whether he personally knew it at the
time or not’.105 Ho« ss, however, did not adduce any evidence of his own or call
any witnesses on his behalf. The cornerstone of his defence was superior
orders, in particular, to Himmler. Ho« ss did not visualize any room whatsoever
to refuse the orders of his superiors.106 This defence failed, although it is un-
clear whether Ho« ss intended it as a basis to disclaim responsibility or, rather,
whether the defence was merely an indication of how he saw himself, that is,
as a crucial cog in the functional apparatus of the state.107
Prusin notes that Ho« ss ‘stunned the court audience with his mild manners,
quiet voice, and most important, his admission of guilt’.108 Ho« ss was in fact
the first senior official to acknowledge the horrors that occurred at
Auschwitz. Several days before his execution, moreover, Ho« ss declared his
‘bitter recognition of how deeply [he] transgressed against humanity’:
As commandant of the Extermination Camp Auschwitz, I carried out a part of the horrible
extermination plans of human beings by the ‘Third Reich’. I have by that act caused the gra-
vest injury to humanity. Particularly have I caused untold suffering to Polish people. For
my own responsibility I pay with my life. May God someday forgive me my conduct. The
Polish nation I ask for forgiveness.109
Tenenbaum notes ‘[t]he omission of any allusion to his Jewish victims’ in Ho« ss’
final declaration.110 Ho« ss was, and remained, virulently anti-Semitic to the
bitter end; he considered the Jews as the ‘enemy’ of the German nation.111 He
105 Ho« ss Law Reports, supra note 2, at 17.
106 Ho« ss, Memoirs, supra note 88, at 153^154 (‘Outsiders cannot possibly understand that there
was not a single SS officer who would refuse to obey orders from Himmler, or perhaps even
try to kill him because of a severely harsh order. Whatever the Fu« hrer or Himmler ordered
was always right.’)
107 Ho« ss himself used the term ‘cog’ to describe his place within ‘the terrible German extermin-
ation machine,’ recognizing that he was ‘totally responsible for everything that happened [at
Auschwitz], whether [he] knew about it or not’. Ho« ss, Memoirs, supra note 88, at 189 (in a
letter to his wife). In an interview with a psychologist while he was at Nuremberg as a wit-
ness, Ho« ss stated: ‘[F]rom our entire training the thought of refusing an order just didn’t
enter one’s head, regardless of what kind of order it was ::: ’. Gilbert, supra note 91, at 230.
That said, ‘[a]t Auschwitz ::: there is not one recorded case of an SS man being prosecuted
for refusing to take part in the killings’. Rees, supra note 50.
108 Prusin, supra note 7, at 11. See also ibid., at 16 (describing Ho« ss as the only Tribunal defendant
who did not ‘vehemently den[y]’ his guilt). Ho« ss saw himself, in his own words as related by
a psychologist, as ‘entirely normal ::: [e]ven while I was doing this extermination work, I led
a normal family life, and so on.’ Gilbert, supra note 91, at 237.
109 Tenenbaum, supra note 2, at 235 (citing Ho« ss Erklaerung).
110 Ibid.
111 Ho« ss, Memoirs, supra note 88, at 142.
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faulted the Third Reich leadership for having caused the war, noting that ‘the
necessary expansion of the German living space could have been attained in
a peaceful way’.112 In his memoirs, Ho« ss scathingly wrote:
Today I realize that the extermination of the Jews was wrong, absolutely wrong. It was
exactly because of this mass extermination that Germany earned itself the hatred of the
entire world. The cause of anti-Semitism was not served by this act at all, in fact, just the
opposite. The Jews have come much closer to their final goal.113
Relatedly, although the Holocaust of European Jews figured prominently in
the trial, the proceedings against Ho« ss also narrated the fate of Soviets, Poles
and victims of nearly two dozen other nationalities in Auschwitz.114 The
Prosecution detailed the killing capacity of the camp, the nature of the forced
labour and the horrid conditions. The Prosecution also introduced into evi-
dence how Poles were registered as criminals only because of their nationality.
The case against the accused, much like that against Go« th, was based upon
witness testimony, documentary evidence and statements by experts; it is also
noted that a ‘film was projected in the court, showing the camp buildings and
establishments’.115
The report on the Ho« ss case accorded considerable attention to the charges
of ‘medical war crimes’, notably, ‘numerous medical experiments ::: performed
on men and women of non-German origin, mostly Jews’,116 under the immedi-
ate direction of Dr Carl Clauberg whose preoccupation was with female infer-
tility. Specific types of experiments included: castration, sterilization,
premature termination of pregnancy, artificial insemination and cancer re-
search. These procedures led to great pain, debilitation, suffering and death.
The discussion of these gruesome experiments is stomach churning. The inclu-
sion of this discussion fulfilled a pedagogic function at a time when informa-
tion about the activities at the camps was inchoately emerging. But for
carefully sourced judgments such as Ho« ss, this information might have other-
wise been met with stupefied incredulity.
The report on the case included within the category ‘other experiments’ that
‘[f]ifteen to twenty-one young girls were deprived of their virginity in a brutal
manner by SS men’.117 This conduct apparently was not described in the indict-
ment as rape or sexual torture. Although very infrequently prosecuted as
such, gender-based sexual violence was recognized at the time as an offence.
The subsequent work of the ad hoc tribunals and the International Criminal
Court has begun to address this painful omission, although significant efforts
112 Ibid., at 182.
113 Ibid., at 183.
114 Ho« ss Law Reports, supra note 2, at 12.‘Soviet prisoners of war were the first victims of this ex-
termination campaign. They were followed by Jews who perished in even larger numbers.
Poles constituted the largest group of murdered from among the registered inmates of the
camp.’ Ibid.
115 Ibid., at 14.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid., at 16.
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are still required to adequately respond to and prevent gender-based violence.
While the ad hoc tribunals have convicted many suspects for gender-based
crimes, as of the time of writing there have been no convictions for such
crimes at the International Criminal Court.
Taken as a whole, according to the report on the case, the Tribunal found
that these medical experiments ‘violated all rules which must be observed
when medical experiments are performed on human beings’118 and the
‘[s]pecial circumstances in which they were performed constitute in addition
elements which allow them to be classified as violations of the laws and cus-
toms of war and of laws of humanity’.119 These experiments were deemed to
serve no scientific purpose. In terms of sources of law, theTribunal additionally
noted that these experiments transgressed ‘general principles of criminal law
as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations’.120
TheTribunal concluded that ‘at least 2,500,000, mainly Jews’were murdered,
thereby departing from the allegation of 4,000,000. In all likelihood both of
these numbers are incorrect, however. In his memoirs, Ho« ss wrote that
1,130,000 people were killed at Auschwitz; the United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum has accepted the figure of 1,100,000, as have other ex-
perts.121 The Tribunal held that Ho« ss took part in the wholesale robbery of
property, rather than supervised it as the indictment had alleged. Finally, as
noted in the report on the case, the Tribunal ‘did not express any explicit view
on the question whether the accused did personally ill-treat or tortured any of
the inmates ::: and in addition brought the corresponding charges within the
wording of the relevant provisions in force at the time of the trial’.122
Like both Go« th and Greiser, the Ho« ss judgment identified the heart of the
charges as falling within genocide. The Prosecution raised this contention
when it came to the extermination of the Jews; the judgment itself noted ‘that
the Nazi Party had as one of its aims the biological and cultural extermination
of subjugated nations, especially of the Jewish and Slav nations, in order to es-
tablish finally the German Lebensraum and the domination of the German
race’.123 The Ho« ss case explored how the grisly medical experiments conducted
at Auschwitz helped operationalize this system of extermination. It connected
these experiments to the genocidal scheme. According to the notes and report
on the case:
[P]aramount importance should be attached to the political aspect of the crime. The gen-
eral scheme of the wholesale experiments points out clearly to the real aim. They were ob-
viously devised at finding the most appropriate means with which to lower or destroy the
118 Ibid., at 24.
119 Ibid., at 24^25.
120 Ibid., at 25.
121 In his sworn written affidavit (and oral testimony) at the IMT, Ho« ss stated that 2.5 million
people were murdered at Auschwitz, with another half million perishing from starvation or
disease, meaning that 3 million people died there in total. He later repudiated this figure,
however.
122 Ho« ss Law Reports, supra note 2, at 18.
123 Ibid., at 24.
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reproductive power of the Jews, Poles, Czechs and other non-German nations which were
considered by the Nazi as standing in the way of the fulfillment of German plans of world
domination. Thus, they were preparatory to the carrying out of the crime of genocide.124
Thus in view of the political directives, issued by the Supreme German authorities, and the
character of the experiments performed in Auschwitz on their orders, it seems obvious
that they constituted the preparatory stage of one of the forms of the crime of genocide,
which was intended to be perpetrated by scientific means.125
Specific mention was made of the X-ray experiments aimed at creating condi-
tions in which injured genes could be multiplied and progenated. Other related
experiments sought to sterilize through drug therapy.
The Ho« ss judgment dovetailed with the overarching narrative that in add-
ition to Jews other national groups also were targets of genocide, notably but
not exclusively Poles. The report on the case specifically noted that Ho« ss him-
self ‘confirmed the existence of plans of wholesale destruction of the Slav na-
tions, and of Poles and Czechs in particular’.126 The Polish Tribunal engaged
with a purposive conceptualization of the term genocide in light of the conven-
tional wisdom that the Nazi genocidal Final Solution (Endlo« sung) was aimed at
European Jewry alone. To be sure, other groups were subject to the commission
of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Tribunal’s findings, however,
were purposive in that it is not generally accepted that genocidal intent accom-
panied crimes committed against the Polish or Czech populations. The overlap
of political motivation with genocide also surpasses the boundaries of the con-
temporary understanding of the crime, although politically motivated violence
may well serve as preparations (as the Tribunal stated) to genocide.
When it came to the intent requirements, the Tribunal innovated insofar as
this element was not firmly set out as a requirement under the underlying con-
solidated Decree. According to Matthew Lippman:
[For] the Polish Tribunals ::: the defendant’s intent was demonstrated through their [sic]
statements, the nature and purpose of their criminal activity, awareness of the Reich’s geno-
cidal plans, and the presumption that the accused were aware of the connection between
their actions and the Reich’s ultimate genocidal aspirations.127
The Ho« ss judgment ç similarly to Go« th ç also dealt with the tricky issue of
membership in criminal organizations. The Tribunal noted that Ho« ss was a
member of both the Nazi Party and theWaffen SS (to be clear, the Prosecution
specifically alleged Nazi Party membership, though focused only onWaffen SS
membership in the closing speeches).128 The Tribunal, however, emphasized
the Waffen SS membership, and the criminal nature of the Waffen SS, despite
the pleadings. It did so because it concluded ç as it had in Go« th ç that Ho« ss
could not be convicted for membership in the Nazi Party as a criminal
124 Ibid., at 25.
125 Ibid., at 26.
126 Ibid., at 25.
127 Lippman, supra note 24, at 78 (several footnotes omitted).
128 Ho« ss Law Reports, supra note 2, at 19.
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organization as Ho« ss was not held to be in a leading position within that or-
ganization. Nevertheless, the sentence more or less conflated membership in
the Waffen SS with membership in the Nazi Party; the former was considered
‘a tool’ of the latter ‘used for committing war crimes and crimes against
humanity’.129
The report on the Ho« ss case discussed the question of criminal membership
in the Nazi Party in some detail. The heart of the legal concerns lay in Article
4(3) of the consolidated 1946 Decree, according to which Nazi Party member-
ship was considered criminal ‘as regards all leading positions’.130 This phrase
predictably became subject to interpretive discussion among Polish judges.
Consensus emerged around the proposition that ‘only such leading ranks and
positions of the NSDAP should be considered as criminal as are enumerated
in the Nuremberg Judgment, i.e., the Reichsleitung of the Party, the
Gauleiters, the Kreisleiters, and the Ortsgruppenleiters, as well as the
Amtsleiters who were heads of offices on the staffs of the Reichsleitung,
Gauleitung and Kreisleitung’.131 This view was definitively affirmed after the
Go« th and Ho« ss judgments by a ruling of the Polish Supreme Court of
28 February 1948.132 Interestingly, among the justifications for proceeding in
this fashion was a perceived legislative wish to bring Polish municipal law in
line with the substantive developments of international criminal law (specific-
ally the London Charter and Nuremberg judgment), thereby demonstrating
how international judgments (even those whose international provenance is
only partial), may serve as best practices benchmarks for national frameworks.
Polish courts, however, were not ‘bound by the fact that certain other group
or organizations have not been indicted and adjudicated [at the IMT] as crim-
inal groups within the meaning of the Charter’.133 When the IMT spoke regard-
ing the criminality of an organization, the Polish courts had to follow those
findings;134 but when the IMT was silent, the Polish courts could on their
129 Ibid.
130 Art. 4(1) thereof criminalized membership in ‘a criminal organization established or recog-
nized by the authorities of the German State or of a State allied with it, or by a political asso-
ciation which acted in the interests of the German State or a State allied with it ::: ’. Art. 4(2)
offered a rudimentary definition and Art. 4(3) non-exhaustively listed several organizations
in which membership was considered ‘especially’ criminal (Nazi Party, SS, Gestapo and the
SD). Art. 4(2)’s definition of a criminal organization was one ‘which has as its aims the com-
mission of crimes against peace, war crimes or crimes against humanity’ or ‘which while
having a different aim, tries to attain it through the commission of crimes [i.e. crimes against
peace, war crimes or crimes against humanity].’
131 Ho« ss Law Reports, supra note 2, at 19.
132 Ibid.
133 Law Reports, Annex, supra note 1, at 82, 87.
134 The IMT declared the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, Gestapo/SD and SS as criminal or-
ganizations. It declared the SA not to be a criminal organization. It made no declaration re-
garding the alleged criminality of the Reich Cabinet on the grounds that: (1) it did not really
act as a group and (2) of the 48 members, eight were dead and 17 were on trial, such that it
was only at most 23 individuals to whom the declaration would have any effect. On the
latter point, the IMT noted that the practical advantages in declaring an organization to be
criminal dissipated when the organization was small.
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own declare a group or organization to be criminal.135 The Tribunal did so in
determining that members of the concentration camp staff at Auschwitz con-
stituted a criminal group (the Tribunal eschewed the term ‘organization’).136
This determination was not made in Ho« ss but in a subsequent case involving
40 camp officials where judgment was issued on 22 December 1947. This judg-
ment held that ‘the authorities, the administration and members of the gar-
rison of the Auschwitz camp [were] a criminal group, irrespective of whether
or not the members of these administrative or military units were at the same
time members of the SS or any other organization pronounced criminal by
the Nuremberg Tribunal’.137 In the Fischer and Leist case, adjudged in 1947,
and the Bu« hler case, adjudged in1948, theTribunal declared the governorships
and top-ranking officials of the occupation government of the Government-
General of Poland to be criminal.138 In Bu« hler, the finding of criminal member-
ship of the accused meant, according to the report on the case, that he ‘had to
bear the responsibility for all criminal acts, whether committed by himself as
one of the leaders, organisers, instigators and accomplices who participated in
the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit such
acts, or committed by his subordinates in execution of such plan’.139 On this
note, then, there is some conflation ç slightly quizzical ç between member-
ship criminality and criminality based upon some sort of command responsi-
bility. In total, it was estimated that this declaration would capture several
hundred persons,140 distinguishing it from the IMT’s decision to issue no dec-
laration in the case of the Reich Cabinet on reasons inter alia that a declaration
in the latter case would have limited practical impact upon fewer than two
dozen people.
135 Bu« hler Law Reports, supra note 5, at 40^41.
136 The IMT did not explicitly include concentration camps as among the groups determined to
be criminal, though was never actually asked to do so. That said, according to the report on
the Ho« ss case, ‘the Tribunal did make in its Judgment many references to the concentration
camps which it described as a means for systematic commission of war crimes and crimes
against humanity’ (Ho« ss Law Reports, supra note 2, at 22) including as a ‘factory dealing in
death’ (Ibid. (quotation directly from the Nuremberg Judgment)). To this end, the approach of
the Polish judges was compatible with the ethos of the Nuremberg Judgment.
137 Ibid.
138 For a lengthy discussion of the factors theTribunal considered in determining this group to be
criminal, see Bu« hler Law Reports, supra note 5, at 43^46 (including in the group at the least
‘all members of the government of the General Government (central office of the
General-Governor), all district governors and their deputies, further all heads of departments
and sections in the governors’ offices and all heads of lesser districts, i.e. all who were com-
monly known as the political authority’). The report on the Bu« hler case notes that criminal re-
sponsibility begins when the member joins the criminal group. Ibid., at 43. Retribution is
identified as a justification for criminalizing membership in a proscribed group. Ibid., at 46.
The report also notes that: ‘Crimes committed by groups of people do not diminish, but
rather increase the responsibility of members of the group, as such acts are more dangerous
than crimes committed by individuals. That is why penal repression of such crimes must be
more severe.’ Ibid., at 43.
139 Ibid., at 45.
140 Ibid., at 48.
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In this regard, then, the domestication of the Nuremberg judgment did not
straitjacket national actors (here, international law was described as applying
only subsidiarily in that municipal law has priority in municipal jurisdiction).
A group explicitly declared not to be criminal by the Nuremberg Tribunal
would not be declarable as criminal by Polish national courts, but there ‘is no
legal obstacle in the way of supplementing the legal principles established in
[the Nuremberg] Judgment by further principles, if in substance they are not
in contradiction :::’.141 Hence, concentration camps could be declared as crim-
inal groups notwithstanding that the Nuremberg Tribunal did not do so.142
The authorities, administrators and personnel of the camp were included
within this group in their individual capacities, but the inmates ‘under compul-
sion’ were not ç ostensibly even those inmates who participated in inflicting
atrocities upon others. This question was far from academic in light of the ex-
tensive use of Kapos and the Sonderkommando (Jewish Special Squads) in the
camps, including in the process of supervising the prisoners, leading many to
their deaths at the hands of SS gassers, subsequently pillaging their bodies
(i.e. by extracting teeth and shearing hair for purposes of Reich business),
and burning their bodies in the crematoria. These inmates, however, could be
found responsible ‘for their personal deeds’.143 Many of the Kapos and the
Sonderkommando, in any event, were ultimately murdered by the Nazis. The
few Auschwitz Sonderkommando who survived soon documented, through
their words and art, the operations of the Krematoria (where many of them ac-
tually lived).
Elaboration was not forthcoming, however, in terms of the required level of
individual knowledge of group activities for the purposes of criminal member-
ship. It is assumed that the Polish court intended the Nuremberg standard to
apply, to wit, that persons ‘became or remained members of the organization
with knowledge that it was being used for the commission of acts declared
criminal [by the Charter], or who were personally implicated as members of
the organization in the commission of such crimes’.144 The report on the Ho« ss
141 Ho« ss Law Reports, supra note 2, at 20. Cf. Grzebyk, supra note 44, at 18 (‘The :::Tribunal con-
cluded that it was not limited by the list of criminal organizations prepared by the IMT and
had the right to extend it save for those organisations which the IMT had clearly defined as
non-criminal’).
142 ‘There is no doubt that the organization of the German concentration camps is a criminal
group in the meaning both of the Nuremberg Judgment and of Article 4 of the Decree of
1944, as these camps had been set up with the aim of unlawfully depriving of freedom and
health, property and life of individuals and groups of people because of their race (Jews and
Gipsies), nationality (Poles and Czechs), religion (Jews) or political convictions (socialists, com-
munists and anti-Nazis). The organization of the German concentration camps thus aimed at
committing crimes against humanity, which at the same time were crimes in violation of the
penal law of all civilized nations, and also war crimes as regards the acts committed against
the Soviet prisoners of war.’ Ho« ss Law Reports, supra note 2, at 20^21.
143 To elaborate: ‘Those people had no ideological ties with the organization of the concentration
camps, but had been simply used as tools for the perpetration of certain crimes. This does
not protect them from punishment for their personal acts, but they cannot be declared
guilty of membership of a criminal organization as a separate offence.’ Ibid., at 21.
144 Ibid., at 23^24 (citation from judgment).
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case assumes that ‘every member of [the camp’s] personnel must have known
that these camps were being used for the commission of acts which any ordin-
ary sensible person must have acknowledged as criminal’.145 This latter conclu-
sion, to be sure, seems eminently reasonable.
5. Conclusion
Recovering theTribunal’s role fulfils a valuable function in detailing the diverse
hinterland to international criminal law and excavating elements that domin-
ant and often ideologically motivated narrations of history may exclude, over-
look or ignore. In the end, then, such a move pulls towards diversifying the
epistemology of international criminal law.
The Tribunal’s work forms part of an underappreciated history, eclipsed as it
was by the IMT; its pioneering discussion of genocide soon was superseded by
the adoption of the Genocide Convention (which paradoxically contained a
narrower definition of the crime than what the Tribunal had put into play);
and its judgments also were overrun, in the case of Ho« ss, by the publication
of his memoirs which have had greater expressive value than his trial judg-
ment, thereby suggesting the limits to juridification as pedagogic tool.
Contemporary international criminal justice institutions have barely given the
Ho« ss and Go« th judgments any attention. Go« th was cited twice (albeit only en
passant) in the 2001 Krstic¤ judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the formerYugoslavia: first, in terms of helping to define the crime of ‘exter-
mination’and secondly (together with Ho« ss) in support of locating a definition
of ‘persecution’.146 Go« th, described as a ‘Nuremberg era case’, was cited (along
with Greiser) by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia in
the August 2014 trial judgment in Khmer Rouge Case 002/01 to support the
proposition that before 1975 courts had ‘entered numerous convictions for
forced movements of population including displacement within national
boundaries perpetrated on grounds not recognized in international law,
namely civilian security or military necessity’.147
The Tribunal nonetheless communicated the destruction inflicted on the
Polish nation (a particularly important political goal at the time), aired the hor-
rors of the Ostrausch, authenticated the terrors of the concentration and
forced labour camps, and contributed to the capital of Kelsen’s ‘juristic con-
sciousness’ by germinating an embryonic legal vocabulary for the Nazis’ elimi-
nationist policies. And it did so at a time when Poland was reeling from
devastation and was roiled with internal refugee movements, disease and
hunger. The scant attention paid to the Tribunal’s work belies the didactic im-
portance of its trials. The narrative of Polish victimhood crafted by the
145 Ibid., at 24.
146 Judgment, Krstic¤ (IT-98-33-T),Trial Chamber, 2 August 2001, xx 492, 575.
147 Judgment, Case 002/01, E313, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 7 August
2014, x 454 and Annex IV ç Table of Authorities.
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Tribunal, however, has become muddled by the mining ç itself a form of re-
covery ç of other trials against actual Polish collaborators. Generated as it
was by Nuremberg’s inadequacies, the Tribunal’s veritable soul-mate remains
the Eichmann trial in Israel. Both of these trials constituted national invest-
ments into the judicial process for purposes of state-building. In both cases,
albeit particularly acutely in Eichmann, the populations tormented by the per-
petrators would determine the fates of the accused.
The1944 Decree, as accreted and consolidated over time, proved to be malle-
able. It served as the foundation of a wide array of separate prosecutions
motored by different goals ç a reckoning for the overseers of the Holocaust
and Drang nach Osten, persecution of dissident traitors to the state, and then
justice for those who had persecuted those putative enemies. Law domesticated
in the wake of conflict may serve multiple goals, including the identification
of actual, inchoate or spectral enemies. Eerie parallels arise between prosecu-
tions conducted under the Polish decrees and those conducted 60 years later
in Rwanda under the gacaca legislation, which was also simultaneously used
to prosecute both genocide-related offences and persons pre-textually alleged
to have collaborated in or denied genocide but who were arguably hounded
for their perceived opposition to the governing Kagame regime. In the case of
Rwanda, the law was enacted for transitional goals and then devolved into an-
other arrow in the punitive quiver of the autocratic state. The Polish case
tends to the obverse. Here, the law was enacted for the purposes of political
control, but then also came to serve transitional goals. The lesson is one of elas-
ticity: domestication of international criminal law, however seemingly idyllic,
may come to serve undesirable ends while illiberal criminal law, however dis-
missively nightmarish, may come to serve salutary ends.
The work of the Tribunal also contributes to the psycho-social study of per-
petrators of mass atrocity. Go« th and Ho« ss stand as dispositional foils to each
other. Go« th ç rash, riotous, mentally unstable, sadistic and impulsive ç
enjoyed the violence as bacchanal and could not contain himself within the
confines of his designated role. Ultimately, his sacking, removal from camp
and arrest by the Germans saved many lives. Ho« ss, on the other hand, was
the consummate bureaucrat. He massacred administratively, matter-of-factly,
and dispassionately. In this regard, Ho« ss epitomizes traits that Hannah Arendt
extrapolated in her discussion of Adolf Eichmann: like Eichmann, Ho« ss simply
seemed ‘terribly and terrifyingly normal’.148 While Arendt’s assessment of
Eichmann has been denuded as incomplete, and hence somewhat caricaturial
in nature, in the case of Ho« ss genocide was about duty.149 In fact, when in
Argentina, Eichmann in a taped interview defended Ho« ss for his work at
Auschwitz, seen as occurring on the ‘front’, and emphasized that had he
received ‘the order to gas Jews or to shoot Jews, I would have carried out that
148 H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (Penguin, 2006), at 276.
149 Stangneth, supra note 72.
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order’, thereby implying that Ho« ss in fact was simply duty-bound.150 Eichmann
felt as such even though Ho« ss, testifying at the IMT in Kaltenbrunner’s defence,
‘stated that Eichmann had not only been involved in the building of the camp
and the decision to use Zyklon B, but that he had also conveyed orders to
Ho« ss and was an even more fervent anti-Semite than Ho« ss himself’.151
Yet for Go« th the violence was about slaking his avarice, actualizing his he-
donistic psychopathy and revelling in a grotesque carnival. These findings
underscore the aching need to develop a heuristic to better understand the
penology of international crime, so as to invigorate deterrent and (perhaps in
the case of lower level perpetrators) rehabilitative efforts. These findings also
suggest pitfalls in essentializing all perpetrators as dispositionally interchange-
able. We simply cannot wish away the fact that atrocity perpetrators are di-
versely human and that humans (not monochromatic monsters or demons)
created the Holocaust.
150 Ibid., at 279. Stangneth contends that: ‘Heinrich Himmler had told the Auschwitz command-
ant that he must carry out the slaughter so that the generations to come wouldn’t have to.
This imperative turned the extermination of the Jews into something that men like Ho« ss and
Eichmann had missed out on: fighting on the front lines.’ Ibid., at 278. The Tribunal’s judicia-
lized narrative, among many others, helped dispel the notion that the genocide was part of a
war effort with the concentration camps serving purposes of military advantage on the
front-lines.
151 Ibid., at 64.
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